pleasures, I would have retired a lot sooner." Indeed, some financial planners have evolved into "life planners" who encourage clients to reevaluate their life priorities rather than accept the status quo of meaningless materialism (Eisenberg, 2006) . This paper attempts to reconcile these widely diverging views of saving adequacy. The seemingly simple question of "Am I saving enough for retirement?" is apparently not so simple at all. Instead, it touches on a variety of deeper issues in economics, psychology, and health policy.
As a starting point, several observations seem to hold true. First, wealth requirements necessary to maintain steady consumption through retirement are indeed daunting for many households, even those with generous 401(k) plans and high incomes. (Readers are warned that life-cycle retirement wealth targets presented below may lead to feelings of financial inadequacy.) Most households cannot save enough to guard against all future contingencies, such as dramatically lower rates of return on investments or unexpected earnings losses near planned retirement.
Second, while smoothing consumption through retirement may not be the sine qua non of retirement planning, it's not entirely clear what is needed for retirement security. In theory, prospective retirees know they can always move to smaller houses or to less expensive regions of the country, or cook at home rather than eating out, but how will their future selves feel about calling the moving van or seeking out less expensive stores? There is no simple answer to this question, because retirement is such a heterogeneous experience that depends on health and temperament as well as wealth (Kelly, 1958) . Still, one can conclude that many newly retired households both anticipate a modest decline in consumption, and adjust to it.
The final observation is that retirement encompasses both age 66, when healthy households can easily substitute leisure for market expenditures on food, and age 86, when few can substitute home production for purchased health care. Growth rates for out-of-pocket health care spending have kept pace with overall health care cost growth, and thus continue to outstrip GDP growth, or may accelerate as firms jettison retiree health benefits. These health care cost projections are perhaps the scariest beast under the bed. Fronstin (2006) estimates that a 55-year-old couple in 2006, planning to retire at age 65, would need to accumulate more than $400,000 during the next 10 years in order to afford supplemental health costs, beyond what Medicare already covers, through age 90. Even in the near term, projections based on the Health and Retirement Study suggest that by 2019, nearly one-tenth of elderly retirees will be devoting more than half of their total income to out-of-pocket health expenses. Thus, saving for retirement may ultimately be less about the golf condo at Hilton Head and more about being able to afford wheelchair lifts, private nurses, and a high-quality nursing home.
Retirement Saving in a Life Cycle Model
A good starting point for calculating retirement saving is the standard life cycle model in which consumption (adjusted for family size) is flat over the life cycle and so is "smoothed" through retirement. Thus, households save while working in order to finance income shortfalls during retirement. Of course, depending on levels of risk, and on how the rate at which individuals discount future consumption compares to the after-tax interest rate, a flat path of consumption may not be optimal, but it is a reasonable first start, and is consistent with observed growth rates in consumption near retirement (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001) .
How Much Wealth Do You Need to Smooth Consumption Through Retirement?
The first task of this paper is to calculate how much wealth you should own to smooth consumption. These calculations are performed only for those aged 40 and up. Readers in their 20s and 30s should be maximizing their workplace matching contributions (Benartzi and Thaler, forthcoming) , seeking automatic saving mechanisms such as house mortgages, and hoping that their generation can still look forward to solvent Social Security and Medicare programs.
I will focus here on non-housing net worth, under the working assumption that most households value the option of remaining in one's house until declining health forces a move or a sale (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006) . Count up 401(k) plan balances, IRAs, business equity, stock investments, equity in second houses, and so forth, but do not count defined benefit pension plans that pay a fixed amount at retirement, or prospective Social Security payments; these will both be included as components in retirement income flows. Take the ratio of net non-housing wealth to before-tax income.
The next step is to calculate the hypothetical target wealth that would allow for smoothing consumption through retirement. Note that the intertemporal budget constraint specifies that (a) current non-housing net wealth plus (b) the present value of net earnings, pension flows, and Social Security benefits is equal to (c) the present value of non-housing consumption plus bequests.
Ignoring bequests for the moment, the unknown wealth level (a) -that is, the difference between (c) and (b) --is the level of current wealth that would ensure a consumption path sustainable through retirement as long as the household shall exist. This target wealth is "The Number"; if current assets are below the number, you're not saving enough, or you need to plan for a reduction in consumption at retirement.
1 In a simplified life cycle, just a few parameters are necessary to calculate this target wealth: 1) current age, expected retirement age, marital status, and retirement planning horizon; 2) the expected real rate of return or interest rate; 3) the mortgage payment rate as a fraction of earnings, where the mortgage is assumed paid off by retirement; 4) the saving rate, as a fraction of before-tax earnings; 5) the retirement "replacement rate" β, or the fraction of retirement annuity flows divided by pre-retirement earnings.
Retirement annuity flows should include any income from a defined benefit pension plan, but for many Baby Boomers (and most academics), the only guaranteed income transfers will consist of Social Security benefits. Americans work until 65, but academics do tend to retire later than the general population.) At age 40, the non-housing wealth-to-income ratio is 1.8, rising to 2.9 at age 50 and peaking at 5.1 when retirement occurs.
Sensitivity of "The Number"
The first sensitivity analysis, in Row 2 of Table 1 , shows the importance of housing wealth in attenuating the need to accumulate non-housing wealth for retirement. Renters would need to set aside 8.6 times income by the time they retire to afford both non-housing consumption (as above) plus 30 years of future rental payments. Thus paying off the mortgage by retirement reduces nonhousing wealth requirements substantially.
Target wealth is also sensitive to changes in the saving rate; the wealth-income ratio at age 40 is -0.5 when the saving rate is 15 percent, and 3.1 when the saving rate is 2.5 percent (Rows 3 and 4). One puzzle is why wealth requirements at retirement are so much larger for the household saving 2.5 percent (5.8 times income) instead of 15 percent (3.8 times income). After all, the saving rate might not seem to matter once households reach retirement. The resolution of the puzzle is to note that the high saving household has gotten used to a lower rate of consumption while working, so less is needed to smooth consumption through retirement. Raising saving rates therefore yields a "double dividend" in life-cycle saving by stimulating asset accumulation and attenuating future required consumption.
Extending retirement age to 70 (Row 5), not uncommon among academics, sharply reduces required wealth accumulation at all ages, while retiring early at 60 (Row 6) raises wealth accumulation. As Row 7 demonstrates, dying early is another approach to ensuring retirement security. A scenario closer to a lower income worker who doesn't own a house --a replacement ratio of β = 0.6, a retirement age of 62, and a saving rate of 5 percent --yields a wealth/income target of 1.8 at age 40, rising to 4.2 at retirement (Row 8). Finally, allowing earnings to grow in real terms at 2 percent, coupled with consumption growth of 2 percent until retirement, leads to even larger wealth requirements relative to the benchmark, since consumption growth also raises the level of retirement consumption (Row 9). institutions is $104,000, the median $134,000, and the 95 th percentile $184,000. To span these ranges, I adopt multiples of $68,000, reaching as high as $272,000 to capture the hypothetical income of very well-compensated dual working households (or a part-time finance professor).
These calculations cannot be generalized to the wealth requirements of low-income households whose saving needs may be more modest owing to more generous replacement rates in Social Security or from Social Security Disability Insurance (Bernheim et al., 2000 , although see VanDerhei, 2006 . Table 2 provides these target wealth holdings by age for single and married households for a variety of income and demographic scenarios. The detailed inputs are described in the notes to Table 2 ; the surprising feature is how important all of these additional variables are for retirement planning. The house is assumed to be worth 2.5 times income, and the mortgage balance, with 20 years remaining, is initially equal to twice income. The equivalence scale of a spouse is assumed to augment consumption by 0.6, while each child increases the consumption requirements of the household by .25. 5 I assume a baseline saving rate equal to 7.5 percent of pre-tax income, with 5 percent to a 401(k) and 2.5 percent to non-retirement assets, split equally between bonds and stocks. This is a flow measure, and underestimates the real saving rate which includes capital gains, the reinvestment of interest and dividend income, and any appreciation in housing equity.
An important assumption implicit in this model is that once the house mortgage is paid off, monthly payments are diverted to saving, not consumption.
Consider the simplest case, of a single person with income of $68,000, and whose contingency planning allows for a 95-year lifespan. As in the previous analysis, I focus solely on non-housing wealth. The first row in Table 2 shows that wealth at age 40 necessary to sustain a constant consumption flow is just $14,000. By retirement, non-housing wealth has grown to $272,000, somewhat below the prescribed wealth-to-income ratio in Table 1 For married households with two children and income of $136,000, saving requirements are $167,000 at age 40, rising to $850,000 prior to retirement (Row 5). In the presence of a defined benefit plan that pays 30 percent of before-tax income, however, wealth requirements drop substantially, with prescribed wealth of only $95,000 at age 65 (Row 6). This is because combined Social Security and pension payments match the consumption of the empty-nest couple (and the surviving spouse) quite closely. As one moves up the income distribution (Rows 7 -10), target wealth measures rise accordingly, but the wealth-to-income ratio for these higher income groups is actually a bit lower; for example, the wealth-to-income at retirement for the household earning $136,000 (Row 5) is 6.2, but is only 5.6 for the household earning $272,000 (Row 10). This pattern largely reflects the progressivity in the tax code leading to less-than-proportional increases in lifetime consumption streams.
A comparison of Rows 8 and 9 suggests a somewhat smaller interest elasticity of target wealth than that suggested by the earlier simulations, in part because the discount rate is less important for college expenses, and also because of declining total expenditures as first children, and then a spouse, leaves the household. compared to Row 3), and that wealth requirements necessary to plan for a future in which the spouse spends five years in a nursing home, are indeed daunting (Row 12 compared to Row 8).
These topics are taken up in more detail below.
How Much Money Do You Really Need to Enjoy Retirement?
As noted above, a variety of studies show that most American households fail to meet saving goals suggested by certainty life-cycle models (Ameriks and Utkus, 2006; Warshawsky and Ameriks, 2000; Shackleton, 2003; Munnell, Webb, and Delorme, 2006; Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006) . Figure 2 shows that even Baby-Boomers aged 51-55 with postgraduate degrees fall short of the conventional savings targets calculated above; the median nonhousing wealth-to-income ratio is 1.7, with the 25 th percentile just 0.5 (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006) .
Many well-educated Baby Boomers will likely need to scale back consumption at retirement. But does this mean that they've failed to save "enough"? Here I consider several explanations for why consuming less at retirement might not imperil retirement security.
Housing Equity Can Be Used to Finance Consumption During Retirement
Some financial planners have noted how much retirees could save simply by unleashing their housing equity and moving to towns such as Henderson, Nevada, where living cost are less than half that in New York (Brock, 2004, p. 74) . 6 A more limited approach would be to purchase a smaller house or condominium in the same town. If one is planning to downsize in the future, it's okay to add some part of housing equity to the retirement nest-egg available for non-housing consumption -but the value should be discounted, perhaps at a risky rate of return. In practice, Venti and Wise (1989) have shown that recent retirees are about as likely to move into more expensive as less expensive housing. The exception occurs when there are adverse transitions such as widowhood or serious illness, at which point households are more likely to tap into housing equity (Venti and Wise, 2004) . Thus, average housing equity tends to decline with age, particularly among older households (Hurd, 2003) .
Still, future retirees are typically unwilling to commit having to move to a smaller house. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) found nearly 70 percent of respondents to the Health and Retirement
Survey aged 70 and under felt there was a minimal (10 percent or less) chance of selling their house to pay for retirement (see also Smeeding et. al., 2006) . Reverse mortgages allow retirees to borrow money against housing equity, to be repaid upon death, but in practice their use has not been widespread (Sun, Triest, and Webb, 2006) .
A middle ground recognizes the option value of housing equity for future uncertain contingencies. Housing equity is perhaps the best hedge against future catastrophic health care
costs, because such equity is often exempted from Medicaid asset limits, and because patients with expensive chronic illnesses who require specialized health care would need to vacate their house in any case (Skinner, 2004) . Even if these adverse events don't occur, home equity can still provide a bequest to children or other worthy causes (Dynan, Skinner, Zeldes, 2002) .
With Children Gone (Or A Spouse Lost), Consumption Expenses Are Lower During Retirement
Any parent will bemoan the expenses of raising children, ranging from diapers early in the life cycle to college education and helping out with housing down-payments later. For this reason, parents may reasonably expect a decline in family consumption as the children depart. The importance of children in life-cycle consumption and saving was emphasized by Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006a,b) , who found 80 percent of U.S. households were optimally saving for retirement after accounting for the timing and influence of children on optimal consumption plans.
Equivalence scales were used to adjust household consumption for differences in the size and composition of it members. Their equivalence scale, from Citro and Michael (1995) , implied that a married couple with two children now consuming $40,000 can smooth person-equivalent consumption by planning for $24,600 in expenditures once the children have left, and $17,000
following the departure of a spouse.
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The importance of equivalence scales can also be seen in ESPlanner by comparing Row 11
in Table 2 , a single parent with two children against Row 4, a single person without children. (In Row 11, the ESPlanner default equivalence scale of 0.7 per child is used.) Target wealth at age 40 is $18,000 for the household with children, and $282,000 for the household without! Despite the additional expense of college, retirement saving is diminished for the parent with children because her annual consumption at retirement is just $49,301, rather than the $63,445 required for the single household.
7 The classic study of how demographic factors affect life cycle consumption is Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1998) , who find more modest effects of children and spouses on consumption.
In other words, parents are already used to getting by on peanut butter, given that a large fraction of their pre-retirement budget has been devoted to supporting children, so it's not difficult to set aside enough money to keep them in peanut butter through retirement. By contrast, childless households with the same income accustomed to caviar and fine wine must set aside more assets to maintain themselves in the style to which they have become accustomed. This assumption is central to why both the Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun studies, and Kotlikoff's own studies using ESPlanner, show that many households are saving too much for retirement (Darlin, 2007) .
In practice, whether parents should plan to continue consuming just peanut butter is not entirely clear, particularly if they want to substitute into more consumption for themselves, or if they value strategic bequests and the warm glow from inter vivos transfers.
There Are Ample Opportunities to Economize While Retired
It is reasonable to believe that households need not spend as much during retirement, given the sudden increase in leisure time. 8 In this view, retirement is an opportunity to substitute leisure, or home production, for market expenditures, given that the "price" of labor inputs into the household production (or the reservation wage) has just fallen (Ghez and Becker, 1975) . For example, retirees now have more time to cook spaghetti sauce at home rather than buy prepackaged sauce, or purchase lower cost but equally nutritious food. And it is certainly true that if households can plan on a decline of (say) 20 percent at retirement, their target wealth while younger declines substantially, from a wealth-income ratio of 2.3 to only 1.1 at age 45 (Table 1 , Row 10).
Consider an economic model in which leisure and consumption expenditures are combined to create contemporaneous utility Z. For those who retire voluntarily, Z will rise simply because the wage rate, or the price of a major input into the household production function, has declined.
This can be shown in Figure 2 , where the contemporaneous utility Z jumps up discontinuously at retirement. It is straightforward to show in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function that consumption smoothing is optimal only when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of Z -or the ease of substituting utility from one time period to the next --is equal to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
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Intuition might suggest that optimal consumption expenditures should drop discretely at retirement, as is shown in Figure 3 . However, this result holds only when the intertemporal elasticity is less than the intratemporal elasticity -meaning that households can more easily substitute leisure for consumption than shift household production (or Z) to later in life.
Conversely, when the intratemporal elasticity is less than the intertemporal elasticity, optimal consumption is predicted to rise at consumption, meaning that households would save more so they could really enjoy themselves during their retirement years.
There is mixed evidence on the relative magnitude of these elasticities; some imply a rise at retirement (for example, Kniesner and Ziliak, 2005) , while others imply a decline. Aguiar and Hurst (2005a) find that recently retired households are remarkably efficient in home production, saving large amounts of market expenditures while maintaining both the quality and quantity of food. Similarly, Aguiar and Hurst (2005b) find that in a cross-section of shoppers in Denver, prices 9 The intratemporal elasticity is related closely to the labor supply elasticity. In standard notation, lifetime utility U = (1-1/γ) -1 ∑ t Z t 1-1/γ (1+δ) 1-t and Z t = (C t 1-1/ρ
with C and L denoting consumption and leisure, δ the time preference rate, ρ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, γ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and η measuring the relative taste for leisure. Alternatively, smoothing holds when consumption and leisure are strongly separable.
for identical packaged goods varied systematically across demographic groups, with higher income and middle-aged people paying more and younger and older households less.
Distinguishing between consumption and home production can potentially resolve a puzzle in the data; 73 percent of retirees wished they had saved more (Hurd and Zissimopoulos, 2003 ), yet the majority of voluntary retirees are as happy or happier being retired (Loewenstein et al., 1999; Charles, 2002; Bender, 2004) . These retirees may not have saved enough for the retirement they thought they wanted, but the additional leisure cannot help but to raise their utility and create good cheer. The story is different when retirement is involuntary because of job separation or poor health, which occurs for 37 percent of the Health and Retirement Study (Bender, 2004) . For this group, subjective well-being declines (Charles, 2002) , a decline that could also reflect a much diminished household production function.
There is a remarkable heterogeneity in the saving adequacy of households, even in academic settings (Bernheim, et. al., 2002) . Perhaps 20 percent of households arrive at retirement with generous replacement rates (β) and asset-to-income ratios, and these households do smooth consumption, or even increase consumption by a small amount. These households also spend more time cooking and shopping (Schwerdt, 2005) . But for the one-third of the population with inadequate replacement rates and wealth accumulation, consumption declines by one-third or more, not because of any specific economic theory, but because of the unrelenting discipline of the budget constraint (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001) . Households largely anticipate the decline (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006) , with the exception of those who didn't plan well for retirement, where nearly one-quarter are surprised by how high their expenses are at retirement (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy, forthcoming) . What we don't know is whether this heterogeneity in wealth accumulation at retirement reflects natural variation in the household production function (some are better at making spaghetti sauce than others) or heterogeneity in psychological biases towards saving (Bernheim and Rangel, 2005) .
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Evidence that favors psychological explanations for variations in wealth accumulation come from the literature on 401(k) plan participation, in which simple changes in program participation default rules, so that workers must opt out of a 401(k) rather than opt in, had a dramatic impact on participation rates (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2004) . In this issue, Benartzi and Thaler discuss this and other default rules involving issues such as the level of contributions to a retirement savings account over time and how those savings are invested.
Similarly, Lusardi (1999) and Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) suggest that simply planning for retirement encourages greater savings, while Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find financial literacywhether households understand compound interest -is also associated with higher levels of wealth.
From this perspective, the lack of wealth at retirement for many Americans may not be the consequence of well-formed preferences, but instead of procrastination or inertia.
However, behavioral models cut both ways in terms of whether retirees will be happy with the savings choices they made earlier in life, because these models also have demonstrated that people have the ability to adapt to new circumstances. For example, paraplegics report happiness levels that are not so far from lottery winners (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman, 1978) . By comparison, learning to live with a 20 percent decline in consumption at age 66 shouldn't be too difficult, particularly for those in comfortable economic circumstances. If households are able to replicate the same nutritional consumption flow post-retirement with relatively little effort, as in Aguiar and Hurst (2005a) , it could even prompt households to wonder why they hadn't economized on expensive food expenditures years before.
Some retirement planners go one step further, taking on the role of life-cycle therapist, and trying to understand what makes baby boomers happy. As Eisenberg (2006, p. 251 In a 10-year period, seven out of ten adults aged 51-61 developed health problems, lost their jobs, or lost spouses owing to divorce or death (Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello, 2005 ; also see Smith, 2005) . Most of these shocks had a sharp adverse impact on wealth: among couples, a new medical condition caused a 17 percent decline in wealth for couples, work disability caused a 16 percent decline and divorce a 44 percent decline, presumably the consequence of uninsured legal fees and other contingencies (Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello, 2006) . Typically, complex dynamic programming models call for higher levels of precautionary saving to guard against such risks.
Once retired, health care is a commodity were opportunities for substitution between leisure and market expenditures is limited. Poor health both restricts the ability of elderly people to engage in home production (for example, if they can no longer drive around to search for low prices) while increasing demand for expensive health care. Also, the elderly face substantial financial risk from health care expenditures (McGarry and Shoeni, 2005; Goldman and Zissimopoulos, 2003; French and Jones, 2004) .
Currently, Medicare requires a 20 percent copayment and a one-day deductible for hospital stays. Most retirees have a "Medigap" plan that covers these out-of-pocket liabilities, while Medicaid picks up the difference for those with low-incomes who are eligible. But the percentage of private-sector employers offering retiree health benefits has eroded, from 20 percent in 1997 to just 13 percent in 2002 (Fronstin, 2005) . Even academic institutions are shedding their retiree health benefits; only 76 percent offered such benefits in 2004, and many of those are planning to drop coverage within the next five years (Fronstin and Yakoboski, 2005) . As noted earlier, a 55-year-old couple retiring in 2016 will need to accumulate more than $400,000 over the next decade to pay for Medigap insurance (Fronstin, 2006) , and this sum does not include protection from nursing home expenditure risk.
To capture the distribution and growth of these expenditures, estimates of out-of-pocket after-tax income (Johnson and Penner, 2004) .
Past trends may not predict the future; the Medicare drug benefits are likely to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket medical expenditures. But the continued loss in retiree health benefits, and the hike in Part B (physician) premiums for high-income households (Foster and Clemens, 2006) , will exacerbate it. Certainly, the prospect of an uninsured (but tax-deductible) five-year nursing home stay for the widow of our hypothetical household in Table 2 leads to a hike of more than $600,000 in target wealth at retirement, as shown by comparing Row 12 with Row 8, albeit one that can in part can be cushioned by saving more (Row 13).
Rising health care costs in the presence of a Medicaid "safety net" could have quite heterogeneous effects on people currently working. Some might respond to future health care costs by increasing retirement saving rates in anticipation of higher out-of-pocket health care expenses.
But others would prefer not to save against these future contingencies and rely instead on government social insurance programs, particularly those such as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) that are only available to people with low wealth (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995 
Conclusion
The question of how much one should be saving for retirement touches on many issues in economics, psychology, and health. While there is much that we don't know, and much that may be unknowable, the literature does offer several lessons. First, greater accuracy in calculating required saving rates or assets can only be a good thing, even if it means wrestling with child equivalence scales, retirement dates, household structure, future interest rates, and other values. In using ESPlanner, I was struck by how many factors -far more than just the standard economic variables -had enormous effects on target wealth. Even a simple spreadsheet program can engender that critical wake-up call to think more about planning for retirement.
But the best laid plans can be undone by a messy divorce, a disabling disease, or a stock market crash. In theory, one could use dynamic programming models in a world of risk to solve for the optimal saving plan, but doing so would simply drive home the point that it's never possible to be entirely prepared for retirement. Second, planning to smooth household expenditures through retirement is a reasonable target, particularly given that wealth requirements for Baby Boomers may be substantially greater than those of their parents. As noted above, saving incrementally more is a good strategy, because it both raises wealth accumulation, and makes it easier to sustain consumption in the future.
Substantial evidence exists that saving programs run through employers -like IRA and 401k
accounts -can be redesigned in a number of ways to encourage greater participation and wise portfolio choices (Benartzi and Thaler, forthcoming) .
Third, planning for consumption smoothing doesn't mean one has to maintain consumption spending through retirement. One could plan on getting by with less just after retirement (as in Aguiar and Hurst, 2006a) , while leaving some assets untouched for future contingencies. Housing wealth is ideal for this type of risk, since equity in the house can be directly transferred to purchase an apartment in an assisted living development, or to help pay nursing home bills. These considerations may explain why households might sensibly hold on to their housing wealth longer than is predicted under standard life cycle models (Sun, Triest, and Webb, 2006) . A more modest goal is to keep enough assets to install a walk-in shower or wheelchair-accessible ramps, but to rely on the government for extended long-term care.
Of course, one also wants to guard against obsessive over-saving -scrimping for years only to die before enjoying it -and the difficult part of retirement planning is in finding that balance.
Nor will the balance be the same for every household; retirement planning should mirror individual psychological preferences or even biological differences in brain functioning reflecting tradeoffs between the thrill of shopping today and the impulse to save for the future (McClure et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2007) ).
Fourth, retirement planning is complex and uncertain even in the absence of fundamental changes in public policy. Short of asteroids, there are likely to be major changes in Social Security and health care insurance during the next few decades (Fuchs and Emanuel, 2005) . A movement towards universal health insurance coverage could lead us closer to the system in the United Kingdom, where the ability to pay for private health care allows patients to jump the queues and get their hip replacements sooner (e.g., Aaron and Schwartz, 2005) . Thus, private wealth may become even more valuable should health care reform provide universal basic coverage without the extras.
Finally, the best hope for future retirement prospects lies in strong and equitable macroeconomic income growth, coupled with moderation in health expenditures and a favorable fiscal balance to fund Social Security and Medicare obligations. Of course, even with these favorable trends, a healthy 401(k) plan won't ensure a happy retirement, but it's certainly a good place to start. Notes: Wealth-to-income ratios necessary to ensure smooth consumption through the household's lifetime. Baseline life-cycle simulation parameters: 3 percent real interest rate, no growth in earnings, retirement planning horizon of 95, retirement age of 65, 7.5 percent saving rate, 20 percent mortgage payment, 20 percent marginal and average tax rate.
income. The home mortgage is assumed paid off by age 60. Two children age 8 and 10 at age 40, equivalence scales for children are 0.25 (as in Attanasio, et. al., 1998) , $20,000 per year of college expenses in 2006 dollars for incomes of $136,000 or more, $10,000 per year for the $68,000 income household. In the medical expenses scenario, tax-deductible out-of-pocket expenditures for a nursing home stay for the last 5 years of spouse's life; assumed to be $40,000 annually (in 2006) but in each year such costs rise at a 3% real annual rate, so that by 2056 they are $175,000 for each of the five years. The household is assumed to reside in Pennsylvania for state tax purposes. 
